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In this paper, we present a model that demonstrates the e®ect of debt on cost of capital and
value in the case of banking ¯rms. Using a static partial equilibrium setting, both in a steady
state and steady growth scenario, we derive a bank-speci¯c valuation metric which separately
attributes value to assets and debt cash °ows in the form of a liquidity premium and tax-
shield. We run our model on a sample of the largest 26 European banks from 2003 to 2016
¯nding that the value contribution of debt bene¯ts to enterprise value is large and persistent.
Further from our model, we derived an implied cost of capital (ICC) measure ¯nding con-
sistent results with capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The theoretical framework we
present is helpful to address bank debt bene¯ts valuation and to reconcile equity and asset
side approaches.
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1. Introduction
Banks represent a particular case in valuation, as they create value from both the
assets and liabilities side of their balance sheet due to the liquid-claim production
(De Angelo & Stulz 2015, Hanson et al. 2015). This peculiar and unique feature of
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banks has several important side-e®ects on the cost of capital and total value as a
whole (Hanson et al. 2011, Kashyap et al. 2010).
Although the e®ect of the liquid-claim production on debt has been widely
acknowledged and investigated in the banking literature (among others: Diamond &
Dybvig 1983, Diamond & Rajan 2001, Gorton 2010, Gorton & Pennacchi 1990,
Holmstr€om & Tirole 2011), from a corporate ¯nance perspective, less e®ort has been
made in identifying a bank-speci¯c DCF valuation model which can highlight the
e®ects of bank debt on cost of capital and enterprise value. More in detail to the
knowledge of the authors, no contribution concerned speci¯cally the stand-alone
valuation of debt bene¯ts and the related discount rate in the banking industry,
whereas in other industrial sectors it has been investigated by various scholars (among
others: Fernandez 2004, Arzac & Glosten 2005, Cooper & Nyborg 2006).
This paper seeks to ¯ll this gap, moving beyond the adjusted present value (APV)
model used by Beltrame & Previtali (2016), which contributes to explain how assets
and debt cash °ows create value in baking. In particular, we ¯rst check the feasibility
of the APV model, analyzing the compatibility between its basic assumptions and
the intermediation role of banking ¯rms. Second, we discuss the risk pro¯le of debt
bene¯ts and suggest a reconciliation equation between asset and equity side DCF
approaches in banking. Third, we discuss the cost of capital implications for di®erent
growth scenarios. Finally, we apply our model to a sample of the largest European
banks to show, on one hand, that debt bene¯ts contribution to enterprise value is large
and persistent, on the other hand, that the implied cost of capital (ICC) estimation we
derived from our model is consistent with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
The most used approach to bank valuation focuses on equity, whereas for other
sectors, asset-side models are the most widely used metric (Barker 1999, Imam et al.
2008). This convergence toward equity-side approach for banks valuation is mainly
due to the liquidity premium banks hold on deposits which entails several issues
when estimating operating cash °ows and interpreting weighted average cost of
capital (Copeland et al. 2000, Damodaran 2013, Massari et al. 2014). The model we
propose in this paper aims at overcoming such issues by building an asset-side
method to banks valuation, with separate valuation of debt bene¯ts.
In an asset-side approach, ¯rm value is obtained using two alternatives:
(a) discounting free cash °ow from operations at the weighted average cost of capital
(the aggregate model); and (b) discounting free cash °ow from operations at the
unlevered cost of equity, and adding, separately, the present value of tax savings (the
disaggregate model, widely known as APV approach (Myers 1974) or, in a modi¯ed
version, as the capital cash °ow (CCF) method (Ruback 2002)). The disaggregate
model exploits the well-known debt-value relation proposed in the seminal papers of
Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963; hereafter MM) and enables to split clearly the
e®ects of investing and ¯nancing decisions on total value. In the case of banks, given
the production of liquid-claims and the associated value creation on the liabilities
side, a disaggregate model could be a useful solution for highlighting debt bene¯ts
and cost of capital implications. A disaggregate asset-side view is not new in the
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banking literature. Bank & Lawrenz (2013), focusing on the optimal mix of bond and
deposit ¯nancing, used a trade-o® model in which the levered value of a bank is
obtained by increasing and decreasing the bank unlevered value by the advantages
and disadvantages on debt, respectively. More recently, Hanson et al. (2015) de¯ned
bank value as the sum between the actualized expected cash °ows on assets and
money-premium on deposits.
However, the main critical issue in dealing with in the application of a DCF
disaggregate model in a banking context is its consistency with the theories of MM.
First, the extension of MM's propositions is debatable because of the incompatibility
of the assumptions underlying the theoretical framework of the theorems due to the
role of banks in reducing information asymmetries in a MM's world. Second, more
technically, a formal restatement of MM's ¯rst and second propositions is prob-
lematic as one cannot separate operating from ¯nancial management both in terms of
cash °ows and cost of capital. In order to overcome these issues, a formal restatement
of MM's propositions for banking ¯rms exploiting the segmented-markets model has
been put forward allowing for the existence of banks in a perfect and complete
¯nancial market (Merton 1990, De Angelo & Stulz 2015), assuming initially the
existence of liquidity premium on deposits, no taxes and no distress costs. In addi-
tion, the model has been developed also considering the presence of liquidity pre-
miums and taxes, but continuing to assume the absence of costs of distress.
In this paper, using a static partial equilibrium model as in Modigliani & Miller
(1958), we separate the contribution of assets from liabilities, in line with the original
framework of disaggregate models for non-¯nancial ¯rms. The model we propose
helps to directly and explicitly reveal the value creation determinants of banks by
providing a more general leverage-cost of capital theory in the absence of distress
costs.
The use of a disaggregate asset-side model for banks can help to overcome typical
problems of DCF aggregate models and, in particular, cost of equity and weighted
average cost of capital redetermination when leverage changes over time. In the case
of banks, exogenous changes in regulatory capital ratios imposed by Authorities have
strong impact on market debt to value ratio and cost of capital. When these changes
occur, an APV approach, appropriately modi¯ed to take into account of the bank
debt's bene¯ts represents a viable solution to avoid both the cost of equity rede-
termination and or valuation errors occurring when the managers and analysts de-
cide to maintain stable the discount rate in the DCF equity side methods (such as the
most widely used dividend discount model).
Besides assuming a disaggregate view of value, the model also provides a sort of
binary approach to bank valuation which is useful in taking into account their
speci¯cs on the asset and liabilities side. On the one hand, the model assigns a portion
of value to assets in relation to their cash °ows and expected return. On the other
hand, the disaggregate approach explicitly attributes a signi¯cant portion of value
to banks' debt when they better manage ¯nancial structure in terms of composition
and pricing.
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A separated view of value also allows to analyze the cost of capital implications
over banks' debt management strategies. The theoretical framework presented in
this paper o®ers an explanation in terms of value on why banks hold an incentive to
fund their assets through deposits or other marked-down ¯nancial instruments. The
liquidity premium gained on this type of debt instruments mitigates the e®ect of the
cost of increasing leverage on cost of equity, with direct e®ects in terms of valuation.
Thus, in the presence of macroeconomic conditions where banks retain wide margins
on mark-down management and in the absence of distress costs, the higher the stock
of marked-down debt, the greater the value creation.
On the whole, this paper contributions to the literature are several. It provides a
theoretical framework for banks valuation which reconciles asset and equity side
approaches, thereby removing the drawbacks of currently applied valuation models.
Besides, it o®ers empirical evidence that banks might have value even if assets
destroy value because of the debt intrinsic bene¯ts. Furthermore, it derives an asset-
side ICC estimation which is consistent with the CAPM but with the advantage of
being easier to implement and using few discretional inputs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the theoretical model. Section 3 introduces a bank valuation framework in a steady
state and in a steady growth scenario and discusses implications of the cost of capital.
Section 4 compares equity and asset side methods in terms of banks' capital struc-
ture. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical application of the model and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Capital Structure and Bank Total Value
The e®ect of leverage on ¯rm value and cost of equity are usually analyzed in the
light of MM's propositions. If the leverage irrelevance principle is valid for banking
¯rms as predicted by the ¯rst proposition, a variation of ¯nancial leverage would
imply a proportional variation in the cost of equity, maintaining the overall cost of
funding stable. The agreed view in the literature is that MM's theorems cannot be
applied to banks in perfect and complete ¯nancial markets, because the absence of
information asymmetries makes unnecessary the presence of ¯nancial intermediaries
(Mehran & Thakor 2011). De Angelo & Stulz (2015) o®er a viable solution for such
alleged incompatibility introducing a segmented-markets model (Merton 1990)
which assumes two ¯nancial markets with di®erent levels of information availability:
a ¯rst perfect and complete ¯nancial market and a second ¯nancial market with
frictions. In their model, banks act in the ¯rst market, and at the same time, extend
loans to agents in the second ¯nancial market, maintaining their role in reducing
information asymmetries between agents, following MM's assumptions.
With regard to investigating the e®ect of ¯nancial structure on value, MM require
a clear split between operating and ¯nancial cash °ows. But this cash °ow break-
down is not easily achieved, because for banks ¯nancial management is part of
operating management. In order to overcome this problem, we reconsider cash °ow
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generation and separate cash °ows from assets and liabilities. In asset cash °ows, we
take into account not only the positive components arising from loans and securities,
but also the negative components related to intermediation costs, which depend on
bank scale and size (De Angelo & Stulz 2015).
Combining the segmented ¯nancial market assumption and the distinction be-
tween asset and debt cash °ows, a static partial equilibrium model to analyze the
e®ect of leverage on bank value is exploited.
2.1. A static partial equilibrium model for banks
Consider two banks with the same class of risk and the same operating expected
return (X) given by the net pro¯t of the intermediation activity, before the deduction
of ¯nancial expenses paid on debt. Both banks operate in the ¯rst perfect and
complete ¯nancial market, and are intermediaries on the second, imperfect and in-
complete ¯nancial market. Bank 1 is ¯nanced only by equity (S1), while Bank 2 has a
¯nancial structure composed of equity (S2Þ and safe debt in the form of deposits
(D2Þ. Bank 2 gains a liquid-claim premium (pÞ, which is equal to the di®erence
between the perfect and complete market interest rate ðrfÞ (risk-free) and the liquid
¯nancial claim interest rate ðrlÞ. Speci¯cally, the liquidity premium is reached paying
debt at rl rather than rf , with rl < rf .
The existence of the two di®erent interest rates in a frictionless market is justi¯ed
by the presence of intermediation costs: they eliminate arbitrage across the two
markets and, consequently, make a liquidity-claims rate lower than risk-free rate
possible. On this basis, according to the seminal work of Modigliani & Miller (1958),
it is possible to demonstrate that for an agent operating in a ¯rst perfect and com-
plete ¯nancial market, di®erent ¯nancial strategies lead to the same bank value in
equilibrium.
2.1.1. \Homemade leverage" strategy
If an investor holds a fraction  of Bank 2 equity, its return Y2 would be equal to:
Y2 ¼ ðX  rlD2Þ: ð2:1Þ
The same investor could replicate the capital structure of Bank 2 selling his stocks,
borrowing on his own credit an amount of debt equal to D2 and purchasing on the
market an amount of equity of Bank 1 equal to ðS2 þD2Þ. He would thus acquire a
percentage of equity equal to ðS2 þD2Þ=S1.
The return Y1 for the so-called \homemade leverage" strategy would be equal to:
Y1 ¼ 
V2
V1
X  rfD2; ð2:2Þ
where S2 þD2 is equal to V2 and S1 is equal to V1, while rf is the interest rate paid on
debt by the investor himself in a perfect and complete market. The investor would
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have the incentive to sell his stocks of Bank 2 and purchase stocks of Bank 1 only
when Y1 > Y2 and until the increase in Bank 1 equity and the decrease in Bank 2
equity make equal the return on Bank 2 with the return on \homemade leverage"
strategy (Y1 ¼ Y2Þ:
ðX  rlD2Þ ¼ 
V2
V1
X  rfD2: ð2:3Þ
2.1.2. \Mixed portfolio" strategy
If the investor holds a fraction  of Bank 1 (unlevered) equity, its return Y1 would
be equal to:
Y1 ¼ X: ð2:4Þ
The investor can switch all his equity unlevered portfolio to a mixed portfolio
(comprising equity and debt) selling his stocks and acquiring a proportional amount
of equity of Bank 2 equal to V1V2 S2 and an amount of debt of
V1
V2
D2. As long as the
investor acts in a perfect and complete ¯nancial market, he would be able to achieve
an interest rate on debt equal to the risk-free rate, rather than the lower interest
rate obtained by agents of the imperfect and incomplete ¯nancial market. Therefore,
the total return on the mixed portfolio (on equity and debt – Y2Þ is:
Y2 ¼
V1
V2
ðX  rlD2Þ þ rf
V1
V2
D2: ð2:5Þ
The ¯rst term of (2.5) represents the yield on equity and the second term the yield on
debt. The investor would have the incentive to sell his stocks in Bank 1 and acquire
stocks of Bank 2 if Y2 > Y1 and until the increase of Bank 2 equity and the decrease of
Bank 1 equity makes equal the return on Bank 1 with the return on mixed portfolio
strategy (Y1 ¼ Y2Þ:
X ¼ V1
V2
ðX  rlD2Þ þ rf
V1
V2
D2: ð2:6Þ
2.2. Leverage e®ect on bank value
Expressed in terms of V2, both (2.3) and (2.6) lead to (2.7) in equilibrium:
V2 ¼
V1
X
D2ðrf  rlÞ þ V1 ð2:7Þ
We can now de¯ne V1=X as the factor of proportionality 1=1 or the inverse of
expected rate of return, that is, the cost of equity for the unlevered bank associated
with a speci¯c class of risk. Hence, (2.7) is formally MM's ¯rst proposition when
deposits are priced considering a liquidity premium ðrf  rlÞ, in line with the view of
Hanson et al. (2015) on traditional banks. Accordingly, the more a bank levers up,
other things remaining equal, the higher the bank ¯rm value. Note that if the
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bank does not gain a liquidity premium, the interest rate on debt is the same as the
market rate (rf ¼ rlÞ. As a consequence, the enterprise value of the unlevered bank
(Bank 1) and levered bank (Bank 2) are equivalent and MM's leverage irrelevance
principle still holds true. On the other hand, if Bank 2 issues debt at lower rates
than the market rate (rf  rl ¼ p > 0Þ, then the enterprise value of the levered bank
will be higher than the unlevered bank ðV2 > V1Þ. In this case, debt will be the
preferred source of funding and, consequently, the leverage irrelevance principle
does not hold.
If (2.7) is re-expressed as a function of the unlevered cost of capital, the enterprise
value of the bank would be equal to:
V2 ¼ D2
ðrf  rlÞ
1
þ X
1
: ð2:8Þ
The ¯rst term of the equation is the Present Value of Liquidity Premium (PVLP),
while the second term is the bank's asset cash °ow discounted at the cost of capital of
the unlevered bank in a steady state framework.
In a perfect and complete ¯nancial market, banks can transform risky assets to
riskless assets by following a policy of hedging. On this basis, our model would
converge to that of De Angelo & Stulz (2015) in which free cash °ows to equity (and
as a consequence the asset cash °ow) are discounted at the risk-free rate. However,
the bank's ¯rm value does not only depend on the value of its assets, but also on the
value created by other ¯nancial services such as investment banking and the many
other activities that banks typically undertake to increase pro¯ts. The risk associ-
ated with this type of businesses cannot be totally eliminated through hedging
strategies, so the discount rate of these cash °ows should be higher than the risk-free
rate.
Thus, in a similar manner to MM's application for non¯nancial ¯rms, asset cash
°ows should be discounted at 1 > rf . The presence of risky assets implies a lower
capacity of issuing safe debt. In fact, banks could lever up without losing the liquidity
premium until debt is equal to the value of perfectly hedged assets and, as a con-
sequence, less than 100% of its enterprise value. The same conclusion is reached by
De Angelo & Stulz (2015) for cases when only an imperfect hedging strategy is
possible, which makes capital requirements useful to cover unexpected losses.
3. Leverage, Cost of Capital and Valuation for Banking Firms
In line with an asset-side disaggregate valuation model used for non-¯nancial ¯rms,
the bank valuation scheme proposed in the previous section separates the unlevered
bank value from debt bene¯ts. Speci¯cally, in the case of industrial ¯rms, the asset-
side disaggregate model determines the enterprise value as the sum between the
value of the unlevered ¯rm and the value of tax bene¯ts of debt. In the case of banks,
as noted above, debt creates value not only through the deductibility of interest
expenses, but also by a liquidity premium on deposits.
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In this section, it is presented that the bank valuation model takes into account
both the tax and liquidity premium bene¯ts in two con¯gurations: the steady state
and the steady growth scenarios. In each scenarios, the authors make distinct
assumptions on the discount rate for the bene¯ts of debt. Since debt bene¯ts discount
rate should be included in a range between the cost of debt (in which the risk-free
rate is the minimum reference) and the cost of asset (Massari & Zanetti 2008), both
valuations are presented in the following section. The approaches they introduce
have di®erent implications in terms of weighted average cost of capital and cost of
equity.
3.1. The steady state valuation
Following MM, we can choose to discount the ¯scal and liquidity premium bene¯ts
using the unlevered cost of equity (Modigliani & Miller 1958) or the cost of debt
(Modigliani & Miller 1963). In the ¯rst case, debt bene¯ts in the form of both
liquidity premium and tax-shields are discounted at the cost of capital for the
unlevered bank. Thus (2.8) becomes:
V2 ¼ PVLPþ PVTSþ V1 ¼ D2
ðrf  rlÞ
1
þD2
rl
1
þ X

1
; ð3:1Þ
where PVLP is the Present Value of Liquidity Premium, PVTS is the Present Value
of Tax Shield,  is the tax rate and X is the net bank's assets cash °ow before
interest expenses. According to Hanson et al. (2015), the interest rate on liquid-
claims is calculated as the interest rate on deposits divided by deposits. More con-
cisely, Eq. (3.1) can be written as
V2 ¼ PVDBþ V1 ¼ D2
½rf  rlð1 Þ
1
þ X

1
; ð3:2Þ
where PVDB is the Present Value of Debt Bene¯ts (the sum of PVLP and PVTS)
while V1 is the unlevered bank value. As we noted above, the valuation approach
provides a useful independent view of bank value, enabling us to understand the
contribution of assets, liquidity premium and tax-shields to the enterprise value of a
bank. However, as in the case of non-¯nancial ¯rms, this valuation model should be
equivalent to an asset-side aggregate model in which free cash °ows are discounted at
the weighted average cost of capital (2Þ whereby debt bene¯ts are included in the
discount rate:
V2 ¼
X
2
: ð3:3Þ
It has been demonstrated that the aggregate model leads to the same result as the
disaggregate model when bene¯ts from tax-shields are discounted at the unlevered
cost of equity (Ruback 2002). Thus, adapting the traditional relation between
weighted average cost of capital and unlevered cost of equity to the case of banking
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¯rms, the relation between 2 and 1 can be written as
2 ¼ 1 
D2
V2
½rf  rlð1 Þ: ð3:4Þ
Other things remaining equal, 2 decreases when leverage increases more than
proportionally according to the size of liquidity premium and taxes e®ect (Hanson
et al. 2011, Kashyap et al. 2010). The model is also consistent with an equity-side
model. In this case, the value of a bank can be measured as
S2 ¼
Y2
i2
; ð3:5Þ
where i2 is the cost of equity. Combining (3.4) with the traditional weighted average
cost of capital formula (3.6):
2 ¼ i2
E2
V2
þ rlð1 Þ
D2
V2
ð3:6Þ
the cost of equity i2 consistent with the valuation approach proposed is obtained:
i2 ¼ 1 þ ð1  rfÞ
D2
S2
: ð3:7Þ
Equation (3.7) is the second proposition of MM. As in the case of non-¯nancial ¯rms,
when bank debt bene¯ts are discounted using the cost of unlevered ¯rm, the cost of
equity is not directly dependent on the tax rate and liquidity premium.
As in the case of Modigliani & Miller (1963) and in line with the original
APV approach of Myers (1974), debt bene¯ts are both discounted at the risk-free
rate (the cost of debt) and therefore Eq. (3.1) becomes
V2 ¼ PVLPþ PVTSþ V1 ¼ D2
ðrf  rlÞ
rf
þD2
rl
rf
þ X

1
ð3:8Þ
and the concise version of the valuation model (Eq. (3.2)) becomes:
V2 ¼ PVDBþ V1 ¼ D2
rf  rlð1 Þ
rf
 
þ X

1
: ð3:9Þ
The weighted average cost of capital and the cost of equity consistent with the use of
cost of debt to discount tax bene¯ts and liquidity premium, are respectively:
2 ¼ 1 1
D2
V2
rf  rlð1 Þ
rf
 
; ð3:10Þ
i2 ¼ 1 þ ð1  rfÞð1 Þ
rl
rf
D2
S2
; ð3:11Þ
where Eq. (3.11) is the reinterpretation of MM's work with taxes integrated with the
liquidity premium. All other things remaining equal, the larger the di®erence be-
tween the risk-free rate and the pricing of deposits, the °atter the e®ect of leverage on
cost of equity.
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3.2. The steady growth valuation model
In the case of growth too, we can assess banks' debt bene¯ts by discounting
either using the unlevered cost of equity (Dempsey 2013) or the cost of debt (Massari
et al. 2008).
Thus, considering a constant growth rate both for asset and debt, following
Dempsey (2013), (3.1) becomes
V2 ¼ PVLPþ PVTSþ V1 ¼ D2
rf  rl
 
1  g
þD2
rl
1  g
þ X

1  g
ð3:12Þ
and (3.2) becomes
V2 ¼ PVDBþ V1 ¼ D2
½rf  rlð1 Þ
1  g
þ X

1  g
: ð3:13Þ
Apart from the steady state hypothesis, X should consider not only bank margins
but also the negative e®ect of additional investments, in order to maintain a certain
level of growth. Also in the steady growth scenario, the model must be consistent
with both the aggregate model and with the equity-side approach. In the case of the
aggregate model, bank value is equal to
V2 ¼
X
2  g
: ð3:14Þ
The weighted average cost of capital making equal the value obtained through (3.13)
with that obtained through (3.14) is reached using the same formula as the steady
state framework (Miles & Ezzell 1980, Dempsey 2013):
2 ¼ 1 
D2
V2
½rf  rlð1 Þ: ð3:15Þ
Thus, when debt bene¯ts are discounted at the unlevered cost of capital, growth does
not a®ect the weighted average cost of capital.
For the equity-side approach too, we can assess the value of equity discounting
the expected free cash °ow to equity at the di®erence between the cost of equity and
the growth rate:
S2 ¼
Y2
i2  g
: ð3:16Þ
As it is noted, the cost of equity in a growth scenario is calculated as by MM in their
second proposition without taxes:
i2 ¼ 1 þ ð1  rfÞ
D2
S2
: ð3:17Þ
Conversely, following Massari et al. (2008), our model becomes:
V2 ¼ D2
½rf  rlð1 Þ
rf  g
þ X

1  g
: ð3:18Þ
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Accordingly, the weighted average cost of capital (3.10) and cost of equity (3.11)
must be restated for the growth scenario. Combining (3.18) with (3.14), we ¯nd
the relation between the weighted average cost of capital and the unlevered cost of
capital
2 ¼ 1 
1  g
rf  g
½rf  rlð1 Þ
D2
V2
ð3:19Þ
and combining (3.19) with (3.15), we restate the cost of equity as
i2 ¼ 1 þ ð1  rfÞ
D2
S2
rlð1 Þ  g
rf  g
 
: ð3:20Þ
Unlike the previous version of the model, in this version, the weighted average cost
of capital and the cost of equity are a®ected by taxes, liquidity premium and
growth rate.
3.3. Choosing the appropriate discount rate for debt bene¯ts
The debt bene¯ts stand-alone valuation requires the choice of the appropriate
discount rate for tax-shields and liquidity premium. In the case of ¯scal bene¯ts
arising from debt, the literature on industrial ¯rms recommends using cost of debt
in the steady state hypothesis (Modigliani & Miller 1963, Myers 1974) and, con-
versely, the unlevered cost of capital in the steady growth hypothesis (Dempsey
2013). In the ¯rst case, when debt is kept ¯xed over time, Modigliani & Miller (1963)
justify the use of the cost of debt rather than the unlevered cost of capital, claiming
the risk pro¯les for ¯rms' operating and tax-shield cash °ows are di®erent. The
operating cash °ow is uncertain and dependent on the risk associated to assets, while
the tax-shield cash °ow is the result of a determined stock of debt. In the second case,
when the dynamic of debt is in line with that of the free cash °ow from operations
(and with the same expected growth rate), the literature discounts the tax bene¯ts
using the unlevered cost of capital (Cooper & Nyborg 2006, Dempsey 2013, Harris &
Pringle 1985, Miles & Ezzell 1980, Ruback 2002). However, the choice depends on
the assumption about future debt policy. If it is assumed that debt-to-value ratio will
remain stable in the forecast period, the discount rate should be equal to the cost of
debt. Alternatively, assuming a constant debt-to-value ratio in the case of steady
growth, the appropriate discount rate should be equal to that of asset cash °ows.
With regards to banks, although there are no explicit references in the literature
to stand-alone valuation of debt bene¯ts, empirical models used to investigate the
e®ect of capital requirements on systematic risk implicitly take the cost of unlevered
capital as the discount rate for debt bene¯ts (Baker & Wurgler 2015, Miles et al.
2013). This is because it is assumed that additional cash °ows due to debt undergo
the same risk as operating assets. This perspective is widely endorsed by the liter-
ature, which considers bank debt to be operational rather than ¯nancial in nature
(among others: Massari et al. 2014). However, these di®erent views on bank debt
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should not lead to treating it as working capital. Although the bank debt instru-
ments hold an operational nature, their contractual representation is equivalent
to that of ¯nancial debt in other industrial companies. Consequently, it should
maintain its function as a stable source of funding even when it holds bene¯ts in
terms of value creation.
4. Comparing Asset and Equity Cash Flow Method: The Capital
Structure E®ect
Empirical evidence suggests a positive correlation between leverage and bank cost of
equity, in both systematic and speci¯c risk frameworks. Among others, Kashyap
et al. (2010) highlight a negative relation between book equity to asset ratio and
equity beta, while Miles et al. (2013) con¯rm the same results ¯nding a similar
relation using the inverse of price-earning ratio as a measure of cost of equity.
Moreover, the relation is still valid using beta or equity standard deviation and both
book and market leverage ratios (Rosenberg & Perry 1978).
Given the empirical evidence that leverage has a signi¯cant e®ect on banks' cost
of equity, the valuation approach needs to consider the dynamics of debt and equity
in order to assess how the ¯nancial structure a®ects value in the absence of distress
costs. The choice in terms of leverage is not negligible in banking because, in addition
to a®ecting the cost of capital, leverage is closely monitored by the Basel framework
which sets speci¯c limitations on the bank's ability to take on debt. Although capital
requirements and leverage are regulated, banks can choose to operate with di®erent
¯nancial structures and may opt to set their requirements above regulation levels or
near to minimum requirements. But such relative small di®erences can have sub-
stantial e®ects in terms of valuation.
The asset cash °ow method introduced in this paper o®ers a potential solution to
the problem of the hypothesis of constant debt to value ratio proper of DCF equity
side metrics almost universally applied in banking valuation. In an in¯nite time
horizon the assumption might be a reliable estimation, but in an explicit forecast
period, the capital structure can no longer be constant (Taggart 1991), making the
capital structure stability a too simplistic assumptions in many circumstances (e.g. in
the case of leverage buy-out operations). In the case of banks, a stable capital can be
an even more problematic assumption, since change in leverage does not depend only
by management and shareholders' choices but also by exogenous variables. The same
problem arises if we implement an aggregate asset side valuation (WACC approach)
since the discount rate is a®ected by the leverage ratio due to the presence of taxes
and liquidity premium.
The cost of equity and weighted average cost of capital redetermination process
require a basic market leverage-cost of capital theory for banking ¯rms, which it has
been introduced in Section 3. Alternatively, the problem can be resolved applying
directly the disaggregate asset cash °ow method, because it does not require the
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market leverage ratio as an input and is more appropriate when target leverage ratios
are linked to regulatory measures. Thus, precise assumptions can be made about the
dynamic of bank debt in the analytic forecast period (Inselbag & Kaufold 1997).
More generally, if a leverage-consistent valuation for banks is required, our model
allows us to move from an asset to equity side approach, still considering the e®ects of
changes in ¯nancial structure on cost of capital and value.
5. The Dynamics of the Bene¯ts on Debt and the Cost of Capital:
An Analysis of the Major European Banks
Compared to the models currently used for the valuation of banks, the model
presented in this paper enables to obtain estimates of how much of the value is
generated by assets and how much is generated by debt. In addition, the cost of
assets implied in the market value of stocks can be extrapolated through it. This
represents an element of innovation in the related literature since, according to our
model, a bank may have a value greater than zero even when assets destroy value.
In this section, we use the model we presented in this paper to estimate and
analyze the dynamics of the value generated by debt on a sample of the major
European banks (26 credit institutions) over a time horizon of 14 years, from 2003 to
2016. We compared the value of debt bene¯ts to the market value of assets and risk-
free in the Euro area to show how value creation on the liabilities side is greater than
assets and it is correlated to the monetary and ¯scal policy.
Secondly, we compare the cost of assets estimations obtained using the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with the ICC obtained using our model. Results show
how our model provides an easier instrument to price assets than CAPM.
5.1. Sample and data
In our analysis, we selected the major European listed banks which, as at 1st January
2018, were under the European supervision of the ECB and for which data were
available. The time horizon of the analysis is 15 years, from 2003 to 2017. For some
banks, the 2017 data were not yet available at the time this paper was written. The
analyses were then concentrated from 2003 to 2016.
The sample consists of 26 banks with assets over 50 billion euro (Table 1). Market
and balance sheet data were extracted from Bloomberg database, while the marginal
tax rate from the OECD website. As far as the cost of capital is concerned, risk-free
have been estimated by using yearly-average of the 10-year bonds yields of the main
domestic market. Beta equity is measured in relation to the Eutostoxx 600 consid-
ering weekly returns for the last 5 years from the valuation date. In order to avoid
discretional biases in valuations, the Market Risk Premium (MRP) was set at 5% in
line with the historical method of estimating assets at risk with respect to risk-free
assets. We also tried to reconstruct alternative estimates of MRP using the survey
method and found several shortcomings in some of the years under investigation.
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5.2. Methods
Using our model and given the bank enterprise value, the cash °ow and cost of the
assets, we quantify the value generated by the tax bene¯ts and liquidity premium
(PVDB) as:
PVDB ¼ V2 
X
1
; ð5:1Þ
where V2 is the bank enterprise value (the sum of market capitalization and debts),
X is the free cash °ow from assets (FCFA), indirectly obtained adding back the
interest expenses net of the tax e®ect to normalized net income. 1 is obtained
through the CAPM ((A.1) of Appendix A) in which we used the delevered version of
beta ((A.4) of Appendix A), we ¯xed the equity market risk premium at 5% level and
we take risk-free rate equal to the average 10 years government bond yield of the
country in which each bank mainly operates for each year of analysis.
To estimate the value of debt bene¯ts we used a one-stage steady state model.
This choice bene¯ts is twofold. First, growth is not taken into account as its esti-
mates  either of idiosyncratic or macroeconomic nature  make the model too
volatile and biased by analysts' expectations along the period under investigation; on
Table 1. The sample.
No. Bank Market Total asset 2016 (mil €)
1 BNP Paribas France 2.076.959
2 Deutshe Bank Germany 1.590.546
3 Credit A gricole France 1.524.232
4 Societe Generale France 1.382.241
5 Santander Spain 1.339.125
6 Unicredit Italy 859.533
7 ING Netherland 845.081
8 BBVA Spain 731.854
9 Intesa SanPaolo Italy 725.100
10 Commerzbank Germany 480.450
11 CaixaBank Spain 347.927
12 KBC Belgium 275.200
13 Dexia Begium 212.771
14 Banco de Sabadell Spain 212.508
15 Erste Austria 208.227
16 Banca Montepaschi di Siena Italy 153.178
17 Rai°feisen Bank International Austria 111.864
18 Piraeus Bank Greece 81.501
19 National Bank of Greece Greece 78.531
20 Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal 71.265
21 Mediobanca Italy 69.819
22 Bankinter Spain 67.182
23 Eurobank Ergasias Greece 66.393
24 BPER Italy 64.957
25 Alpha Bank Greece 64.872
26 Banca Popolare di Milano Italy 51.131
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the other side they do not re°ect perpetual growth. Second, in DCF two-stage models,
generally the terminal value represents the 70–80% of the value of a company.
We run our version of one-stage asset side valuation model to assess the value of
debt bene¯ts for all the banks in our sample (data were available for 24 of them) and
then we treated the results aggregating the single estimations. The model is based on
the assumption that the market at the end of year already incorporates the analysts'
estimations on bank results of the ¯scal year in course. An example of the model we
used is in Table 2.
As far as cost of capital is concerned, according to the literature concerning
ICC estimation methods (among others: Hou et al. 2012, Li & Mohanram 2014),
the valuation method developed in this paper allows to extrapolate the cost of bank
assets using the following formula:
1 ¼
X þD2½rf  rlð1 Þ
V2
: ð5:2Þ
The reference obtained with (5.2) is compared with the average cost of capital
obtained with CAPM for the observation period.
5.3. Results
In Fig. 1, we highlight the incidence of present value of debt bene¯ts on enterprise
value, using for each year the aggregate values of banks.
Table 2. Example of One-stage model applied in our model.
BNP Paribas 2008 2009 2010
Market cap 27.470,0 66.215,0 56.992,7
Total liabilities 2.016.583,0 1.977.354,0 1.912.529,0
Enterprise value 2.044.053,0 2.043.569,0 1.969.521,7
FCFA 15.850,4 14.089,8 16.114,1
Normalized Net Income 3.019,7 5.593,3 8.063,4
Interest expenses (1-t) 12.830,7 8.496,6 8.050,7
Cost of asset 4,30 3,84 3,30
Risk-free þ Country risk 4,23 3,64 3,12
Equity beta 1,04 1,25 1,29
Market Risk Premium 5,0 5,0 5,0
Asset beta 0,01 0,04 0,04
Market value of asset 368.872,1 366.865,4 487.937,9
Market value of debt bene¯ts 1.675.180,9 1.676.703,6 1.481.583,9
Note: Market cap and total liabilities constitute the enterprise value at the end of the year.
FCFA is measured summing the Normalized Net Income and the Interest expenses net of the
marginal tax rate. Risk-free þ Country Risk is equivalent to the average yield of the do-
mestic government 10 years bond. Equity beta is measured at the end of the ¯scal year on 5
years weekly returns over the Eurostoxx 600. Market risk premium is ¯xed at 5%. Asset beta
is estimated using delevered equity beta.
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The importance of assigning value to debt can be seen in Fig. 1 By linking the
performance of the equity markets (Price to Book Value, PBV), the market value of
assets and debt on the enterprise value (respectively Present Value of Debt Bene¯ts,
PVDB; Present Value of Asset, PVA) and Risk-free, emerge some relevant evidence.
First, the contribution of the value of the debt bene¯ts to the total enterprise
value is always greater than the assets until the level of risk-free is such as to allow to
extract adequate level of value from debt. Beyond a level deemed acceptable (in our
case 2.78%), the contribution of the value of the assets becomes greater than that of
the debt as liquidity premium tends to increasingly shrink.
Second, the ¯nancial crisis of 2008 shows how the market strongly penalized
banks and that during periods of ¯nancial turmoil and greater uncertainty  be-
sides increased by the opacity of bank assets  debt and asset's di®erence in terms
of contribution to value is persistent and large. In this market condition assessing the
ability to extract value from debt is relatively more straightforward than the assets
so that the contribution to value of debt bene¯ts is on average 63.4% in the 2008–
2013 period.
Thirdly, despite the recovery in the market prices of banks and more generally of
the ¯nancial markets since 2011, the sharp decline in the level of risk-free basically
due to the ultra-expansive monetary policy adopted by ECB, kept the multiple on
book value of equity far below the unit (0.63 on average in the three years period
2014–2016). Although the increase of the value of assets, the stability of the PBV
clearly shows how the margins of the banking activity are strongly correlated to
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Fig. 1. Stock markets, debt value and risk-free.
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risk-free rates and how a zero-rates can strongly compromise bank pro¯tability and
value. In such conditions debt bene¯ts account for 24.95% of the value.
With regard to the estimates we have made regarding the cost of assets,
comparing the implicit estimation results in our model with those obtained through
the CAPM, the evidence shows substantial consistency between the two methodol-
ogies (Fig. 2). The di®erence in estimations we have obtained is very small. This
result is, in the opinion of the authors, positive because our model is not a pricing
model, but when it is still used to test its consistency in this regard, it performs
substantially as a pricing model, with the advantage of being much simpler and less
discretionary to calculate than the CAPM.
However, the risk premium obtained with the CAPM is almost always higher
than with the method introduced in this paper. These minimal di®erences might
stem from the intrinsic characteristics of the estimation models. Our model over-
weights the fundamentals risk at the moment of valuation, while the CAPM tends to
incorporate the correlation to systematic risk only more by dragging the historical
correlation between security and market at the time of valuation (in our case 5 years
back from the time of valuation).
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a theoretical framework for bank valuation, reconciling asset and
equity side approaches while explicitly taking into account the ¯nancial structure
and the unique bene¯ts banks obtain from liquidity premium. It formalizes a DCF
disaggregate asset-side model showing the contribution of assets and debt to
enterprise value. Consistently with the original assumptions of MM's propositions,
the segmented markets model is used as in De Angelo & Stulz (2015), but it di®ers in
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Fig. 2. Implied cost of assets and CAPM.
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three main aspects. First, using MM's original arbitrage proof, it is shown how to
determine the equity value of a bank using an indirect approach to valuation
(Hanson et al. 2015). Unlike most applied valuation metrics, this enables to split
value creation between assets and liabilities. Second, the presence of risky assets,
rather than just hedged assets, is assumed, in order to take into account the riskiness
of cash °ows from assets, which is a realistic assumption in a context of valuation.
Third, the cost of capital implications when the liquidity premium and taxes come
into play is derived. This shows how the mark-down spread mitigates the e®ect of
increasing leverage on the cost of equity.
On this basis, it might be concluded that MM's irrelevance principle is not valid
for banks owing to the liquidity premium banks gain on marked-down ¯nancial
instruments, which makes the choices on ¯nancial structure relevant in terms of
value. According to MM's ¯rst proposition with taxes, total bank value is the sum of
the stand-alone asset value and debt advantages (Miller 1995). In addition, the cost
of capital implications are in line with MM's partial o®-set, which can be highlighted
empirically. These conclusions lay the foundation for a theory of leverage-bank cost
of capital and for a bank-speci¯c valuation scheme based on asset and debt cash °ows
in which the total value is a function of the present value of cash °ows from asset, tax
bene¯ts and the liquidity premium, similarly to the APV of Myers (1974) and the
CCFs of Ruback (2002) applied in the valuation of industrial ¯rms. Additionally, we
contribute to the literature by presenting the model both in a steady state and steady
growth scenarios, providing a reconciliation between asset-side model and the equity
DCF methods.
We also presented the results of an empirical application of one-stage asset-side
valuation derived by our model ¯nding evidence that debt bene¯ts represents almost
the larger portion of the enterprise value of banks until the risk-free rate is considered
acceptable for extracting value from deposits. Then our model helps to explain why
banks even when assets destroy value or operates with limited bu®ers of capital
might anyway hold a positive value. In this sense, our model can represent a useful
method to assess the market value of debt. In addition, results con¯rm that mac-
roeconomic conditions a®ect bank value through interest rates. Lower interest rates
reduce the value created by mark-down and ¯scal bene¯ts on debt. The closer the
liquidity premium moves to zero and the more neutral the ¯scal e®ect, in the absence
of distress costs, the more irrelevant the choice between equity and debt. However, in
the presence of distress costs, increasing regulatory capital in the form of equity
becomes the most appropriate source of funding for reducing such costs (Allen et al.
2015, Admati & Hellwig 2013). Equity can generate value because the decrease
in debt bene¯ts is more than compensated for by the decrease in the present value
of distress costs. Empirical evidence highlights a positive correlation between
bank value and equity capital, owing to the lower probability of being closed
(Mehran & Thakor 2011). In fact, as the probability of default increases, the negative
e®ect on the bank's value is twofold: on the one hand, the present value of distress
costs reduces the value of the bank; on the other hand, as the event of default
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approaches, it reduces the generation of the liquidity premium, since the latter is
totally given when the debt is perceived as not risky.
Lastly, this paper provides an ICC method which is an useful instruments to
assess the cost of assets instead of the CAPM. Results show a strong correlation
between the two with very small di®erences, with the advantage that our ICC
estimation does not incorporate historical correlation of the single security with the
market portfolio and is less dependent to discretional choices.
On the whole the theoretical framework presented in this paper has useful
applications in bank valuation. First, compared to the currently applied DCF
equity-side models, the disaggregate perspective to valuation reveals more clearly
where, between assets and liabilities, the value of a bank is generated. Other
equity-side methods lack such useful information, providing only a synthetic view
of value creation. More speci¯cally, the minimum regulatory requirements that
banks must comply with do not negate the need to analyze the e®ects of ¯nancial
structure on value, as banks can create value not only by choosing between equity
and debt, but also by choosing between several types of debt ¯nancial instruments
available for each special category of ¯rm, on which depends the size of the li-
quidity premium. Second, the disaggregate model does not require the assump-
tions typical of the DCF equity side methods, namely the distribution of the
excess capital, the adjustments for such capital distribution, a stable capital
structure in the forecast period and the assumption on the level of distributable
earnings. A ¯nancial analyst or bank manager could bene¯t from the method
explicitly re°ecting changes in capital requirements or di®erent bank leverage
policies in bank valuation.
The main limitation of the model is that it does not take into account the present
value of distress costs. Future research is called to introduce this e®ect into the bank
valuation scheme, formalizing a trade-o® between debt advantages (liquidity pre-
mium and tax-shields) and disadvantages in term of distress costs.
Appendix A. Systematic Risk and Leverage: Determining the Cost
of Unlevered Bank
A separate determination of bank unlevered value requires the use of the unlevered
cost of equity (1Þ to discount the asset cash °ows. The cost of equity for the
unlevered ¯rm is generally unobservable due to the presence of levered ¯rms in the
¯nancial market. Assuming a perfectly diversi¯ed investor, we can express 1
through the CAPM relation:
1 ¼ rf þ Uðrm  rfÞ; ðA:1Þ
where U is the beta of the unlevered bank, and where rm is the return of the
market portfolio. Allowing the CAPM, the problem shifts to the calculation of the
unlevered beta.
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Hamada (1972) introduced a model to determine an unlevered (or asset) beta
combining MM's second proposition and the CAPM. Assuming that the beta of debt
is zero (in line with prior studies analyzing the e®ect of leverage on bank overall cost
of capital) and debt bene¯ts are discounted using at the unlevered cost of capital, we
can establish the relation between levered and unlevered beta as:
E ¼ U 1þ
D
S
 
: ðA:2Þ
Alternatively, when debt is ¯xed and debt bene¯ts are discounted at the cost of debt
(risk-free rate), Equation (5.2) becomes:
E ¼ U 1þ ð1 Þ
rl
rf
D
S
 
: ðA:3Þ
Independently of whether debt bene¯ts are discounted at the cost of unlevered
capital, the Hamada equation is the same of the case of non-¯nancial ¯rm. In con-
trast, equity betas are a®ected by taxes and by the di®erence between the risk-free
rate and the cost of core deposits. Inverting the two relations, we reach the unlevered
beta in the two di®erent basic assumptions, respectively:
U ¼
E
1þ DS
  ; ðA:4Þ
U ¼
E
1þ ð1 Þ rlrf DS
h i : ðA:5Þ
Appendix B. A Comparison Between the Asset Cash Flow Method and
Flow to Equity Model
The following example based on data in Table B.1 provides a comparison in terms of
application of the asset cash °ow method and °ow to equity model. The example aims
to demonstrate that if the cost of equity is not consistently determined over time,
signi¯cantmistakes in valuation can occur.Weassume the absence of taxes and growth
in the terminal value and require an increasing level of capital requirement (Tier 1)
covered by equity.
Applying the asset cash °ow method, the bank unlevered value is
V1 ¼
FCFA
ð1þ 1Þ
þ FCFAð1þ 1Þ2
þ FCFAð1þ 1Þ3
þ FCFAð1þ 1Þ4
þ FCFA
1
1
ð1þ 1Þ4
¼ 29; 500ð1þ 3:42%Þ þ
29; 500
ð1þ 3:42%Þ2 þ
29; 500
ð1þ 3:42%Þ3 þ
29; 500
ð1þ 3:42%Þ4
þ 29; 500
3:42%
1
ð1þ 3:42%Þ4 ¼ 862; 573:
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The present value of debt bene¯ts (in this case represented by a liquidity premium
since we are assuming the absence of taxes) is
PVDB¼D0
rf  rl
ð1þ1Þ
þD1
rf  rl
ð1þ1Þ2
þD2
rf  rl
ð1þ1Þ3
þD3
rf  rl
ð1þ1Þ4
þD4
rf  rl
1
1
ð1þ1Þ4
¼ 940;000 3%2:50%ð1þ3:42%Þ þ940;000
3%2:50%
ð1þ3:42%Þ2 þ935;000
3%2:50%
ð1þ3:42%Þ3
þ930;000 3%2:50%ð1þ3:42%Þ4 þ925;000
3%2:50%
3:42%
1
ð1þ3:42%Þ4 ¼ 135;444:
The bank ¯rm value is
V2 ¼ V1 þ PVDB ¼ 862; 573þ 135; 444 ¼ 998; 017
while value of equity is
S2 ¼ V2 D2 ¼ 998; 017 940; 000 ¼ 58; 017:
Table B.1. Balance sheet and ¯nancial market data.
In € 1 2 3 4 00
Account value of
assets (t)
1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000
Risk weighted assets
density (t)
50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Target Tier 1 ratio (t) 12% 13% 14% 15% 15%
Targete account value
of Equity (t)
60,000,000 65,000,000 70,000,000 75,000,000 75,000,000
Target Debt (t) 940,000,000 935,000,000 930,000,000 925,000,000 925,000,000
FCFA (t) 29,500,000 29,500,000 29,500,000 29,500,000 29,500,000
Cost of assets 3.42% 3.42% 3.42% 3.42% 3.42%
Risk-free rate 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00%
Return on debt 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50%
Note: Book value, expected return on asset and risk weighted assets are ¯xed. After Period 4 a steady
state scenario is adopted. The main hypothesis is a progressive replacement of debt with equity,
according to an expected growth of Tier 1 ratio from 12% to 15%. As a consequence, some repayments of
debt through shareholder capital are expected. FCFA are free cash °ows from assets.
Table B.2. Cash °ow statement.
Data in € 1 2 3 4 00
FCFA 29,500,000 29,500,000 29,500,000 29,500,000 29,500,000
Interest expenses 23,500,000 23,500,000 23,375,000 23,250,000 23,125,000
Debt repayment  5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 
FCFE 6,000,000 1,000,000 1,125,000 1,250,000 6,375,000
Note: In the absence of taxes, the free cash °ow to equity is given by netting free cash
°ow from assets of interest expenses and debt repayments. Interest expenses are calcu-
lated on the debt at the beginning of the year using the cost of debt.
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Moving toward a °ow to equity method, we calculate ¯rst the cost of equity and then
the equity value
i2 ¼ 1 þ ð1  rfÞ
D2
S2
¼ 3:42%þ ð3:42% 3%Þ 940; 000
58; 017
¼ 10:22%:
In order to directly reach the value of equity, we need to know the free cash °ow to
equity. In Table B.2 we provide a summary of a cash °ow statement.
The equity value is determined as
S2 ¼
FCFE1
ð1þ i2Þ
þ FCFE2ð1þ i2Þ2
þ FCFE3ð1þ i2Þ3
þ FCFE4ð1þ i2Þ4
þ FCFE4
i2
1
ð1þ i2Þ4
¼ 6000ð1þ 10:22%Þ þ
1000
ð1þ 10:22%Þ2 þ
1125
ð1þ 10:22%Þ3 þ
1250
ð1þ 10:22%Þ4
þ 6375
10:22%
1
ð1þ 10:22%Þ4 ¼ 50; 217:
As we noted above, unless the cost of equity is stated consistent with leverage
changes, the result of the °ow to equity model is misleading. In Table B.3, we report
the dynamics of leverage ratio and the consistent changes in cost of equity.
Using the correct cost of equity for each year, we arrive at an equity value
consistent with that of the asset cash °ow model
S2¼
FCFE1
ð1þ i2;1Þ
þ FCFE2ð1þ i2;1Þð1þ i2;2Þ
þ FCFE3ð1þ i2;1Þð1þ i2;2Þð1þ i2;3Þ
þ FCFE4ð1þ i2;1Þð1þ i2;2Þð1þ i2;3Þð1þ i2;4Þ
þFCFE4
i2;1
1
ð1þ i2;1Þð1þ i2;2Þð1þ i2;3Þð1þ i2;4Þ
¼ 6000ð1þ10:22%Þþ
1000
ð1þ10:22%Þð1þ10:23%Þþ
1125
ð1þ10:22%Þð1þ10:23%Þð1þ9:67%Þ
þ 1250ð1þ10:22%Þð1þ10:23%Þð1þ9:67%Þð1þ9:18%Þ
þ 6375
8:76%
1
ð1þ10:22%Þð1þ10:23%Þð1þ9:67%Þð1þ9:18%Þ ¼ 58;017:
Table B.3. Leverage and cost of equity dynamic.
Data in € 1 2 3 4 00
Bank unlevered value 862,573,099 862,573,099 862,573,099 862,573,099 862,573,099
Present value of debt bene¯ts 135,443,615 135,375,787 135,305,639 135,258,091 135,233,918
Bank ¯rm value 998,016,714 997,948,886 997,878,738 997,831,191 997,807,018
Present value of debt (t-1) 940,000,000 940,000,000 935,000,000 930,000,000 925,000,000
Equity 58,016,714 57,948,886 62,878,738 67,831,191 72,807,018
D/E 16.20 16.22 14.87 13.71 12.70
Cost of equity 10.22% 10.23% 9.67% 9.18% 8.76%
Note: The present value of debt bene¯ts is calculated using the liquidity premium applied to debt at the
beginning of the year and discounted at the expected return of assets.
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